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LAW, SOCIETY, AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION IN JAPAN
ERIC A. FELDMAN∗
I. INTRODUCTION
This Essay examines conflict over medical malpractice claims in Japan,
and uses it as a lens through which to view the relationship between tort
law and its social, economic, and political context. Allegations of medical
malpractice in Japan have been rising rapidly. What explains the
increasing willingness of people who believe that they are victims of
medical malpractice to sue? And what (if anything) does the upswing in
malpractice litigation suggest about the changing role and importance of
the legal system in the lives of the Japanese people?
The relationship between law and society in Japan has long been the
source of scholarly speculation, and occasionally the topic of serious
academic analysis.1 The two most widely held points of view are
dramatically different. One suggests that “Japanese culture” (rarely
defined but generally assumed to encompass social values, norms of
behavior, and modes of interpersonal interaction) places a high premium
on the preservation of social harmony and the avoidance of open conflict.2
In that view, the language of law is subordinate to the power of social
integration, and leads people to forego lawsuits. The other explanation for
Japan’s low litigation rates posits a more structural cause, namely that the
elite have created barriers to inhibit access to the legal system and limit the
extent to which courts can be a potent force of social change.3 Among the
∗ This Essay was originally published in FAULT LINES: TORT LAW AS CULTURAL PRACTICE
(David M. Engel & Michael McCann eds.) (forthcoming 2009) ((c) 2009 by the Board of Trustees of
the Leland Stanford Jr. University, all rights reserved; by permission of the publisher, www.sup.org).
The research and writing of this Essay was supported in part by a University of Pennsylvania Law
School Faculty Summer Research Grant. I am grateful to Robert Leflar, Craig Martin, and Frank
Upham for their comments on an earlier draft of this Essay; to Alison Stein for outstanding editorial
assistance; to Timothy Van Dulm for his professional research help; and to many friends and
colleagues in Japan, especially Kawabata Yoshiharu and Kodama Yasushi.
1. Eric A. Feldman, Law, Culture, and Conflict: Dispute Resolution in Postwar Japan, in LAW
IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 50 (Daniel H. Foote ed., 1997); Anthony Cole, Commercial Arbitration
in Japan: Contributions to the Debate on Japanese “Non-Litigousness,” 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
29 (2007).
2. Takeyoshi Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE
LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 41 (Arthur T. von Mehren ed., 1963).
3. John Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUD. 359, 373 (1978);
FRANK UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN 16 (1987).
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most important of those barriers are constraints on the number of licensed
attorneys, the imposition of high case filing fees, a slow and costly civil
litigation process, and limited damage awards.4
Medical malpractice litigation provides an ideal opportunity to
reexamine these conflicting theories about the relationship between law
and society in Japan. Over the past several decades, particularly the past
ten years, medical malpractice lawsuits have increased rapidly.5 The
numbers are small, but the rates of increase are not. From only 102
malpractice claims filed in Japanese courts in 1970, the number escalated
ten-fold to 1003 in 2003; in the decade between 1992 and 2002 claims
grew by almost 150%, from 371 to 906.6 To what extent does this support
the view that cultural constraints to litigation have softened over the past
decades? Does it suggest that structural barriers previously inhibiting
access to the formal legal system have been reconfigured?
Unlike most analyses of litigation in Japan that examine its relative
infrequency, this Essay focuses on the growing frequency of medical
malpractice litigation and offers an explanation for its cause and
consequences. It claims that more malpractice claims are reaching the
courts for both cultural and structural reasons. First, formidable structural
barriers to civil litigation have been softened, some that affect all civil
cases and others specific to medical malpractice. The increasing size of the
bar, for example, makes it easier for potential plaintiffs to find attorneys,
and the creation of a new expert witness system expedites malpractice
suits. Second, these structural changes have occurred in, and are
intertwined with, a broader social and political climate that is increasingly
fertile ground for the escalating rates of malpractice claiming. An overall
decrease in the trust placed in medical elites, for example, and media
coverage that highlights malfeasant doctors have created an atmosphere in
which malpractice litigation is increasingly attractive.
The consequence and broader significance of the rise in medical
malpractice claims, although speculative, is far-reaching. The interaction
of structural changes that facilitate the use of the courts with broader
4. Haley, supra note 3, at 378–89.
5. As claims have escalated, so too has the public discourse, with the media, medical and legal
organizations, elected officials, bureaucrats, and others debating the cause of the escalation and what
(if anything) should be done in response. See, e.g., Andrew Feld, Culture and Medical Malpractice:
Lessons from Japan. Is the “Reluctant Plaintiff a Myth?, 101 AM. J. GASTROENTEROLOGY 1949–50
(2006).
6. See SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, IJIKANKEISOSHŌ JIKEN NO SHINRYŌKAMOKUBETU KISAI
KENSU [REPORT OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION COMMISSION (REPORT 4, NUMBER OF
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES RESOLVED BY PRACTICE] (2005), http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/
about/iinkai/izikankei/toukei_04.html [hereinafter MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT 4].
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socio-political changes that reinforce the attractiveness of litigation could
well cause the number of medical malpractice lawsuits to continue to rise.
Although that interaction is difficult to document, it is relatively easy to
describe. The creation of specialized medical courts and the increasing
availability of attorneys, for example, underscore the legitimacy of seeking
legal advice and the acceptability of formalizing one’s grievances into
lawsuits. As the demand for attorneys grows and more claims are filed, a
greater number of lawyers will be attracted to medical malpractice as a
field of expertise, and courts will accommodate the growing caseload.
Further, the rise in medical malpractice claims highlights a significant
departure from the government’s long-standing approach to the filing of
tort-related claims, which had effectively shut the door to tort litigation.
Potential litigants faced such daunting institutional barriers to suing that
they had little choice but to resolve their claims through alternative
channels. Ultimately, people came to prefer extra-judicial solutions to
formal legal institutions. Now, through a number of loosely related
reforms, the government is loosening and lessening the barriers to the
courts by, for example, licensing additional lawyers, creating new court
procedures that have led to shorter trials, streamlining the process for
recruiting expert witnesses, and designating specialized courts to resolve
medical malpractice lawsuits. Whereas a rise in the incidence of tort-based
litigation was once a catalyst to the creation of alternative means of
dispute resolution or administrative compensation systems, medical
malpractice litigants are now promised a faster, more narrowly tailored
legal process that makes suing increasingly attractive.7 What this shift
demonstrates is a new legitimacy for litigation, and an increasingly
important place for law in the lives of Japanese citizens. Such a claim is
difficult to support empirically; the data and observations offered in this
Essay outline the argument and begin to build the case.
II. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN JAPAN: THE ESCALATION OF LITIGATION
As indicated earlier, the frequency of medical malpractice litigation has
changed dramatically over the past several decades. In 1970, only 102 new
malpractice cases were filed in Japan. That number increased to 310 in
1980, varied between 196 and 381 from 1980 to 1992, and then began to
7. CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & MARK D. WEST, ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN: THE IMPACT OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL RULES 241 (2004) (observing
“increased legalization” in Japanese corporate governance and noting that “[t]he role of lawyers in the
Japanese economy, and in society generally, will continue to increase.”).
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climb, reaching 795 new filings in 2000 and 1110 in 2004 before dropping
slightly over the next two years.8 The backlog of malpractice cases also
steadily rose from the early 1990s through 2004, leading to a growing
concern about whether courts are able to resolve malpractice claims in a
timely manner.9 And for the first time, in 2000 and 2001, more medical
malpractice cases were resolved through litigation than court-supervised
mediation, and in some instances plaintiffs had joined forces by
aggregating their claims.10 Finally, the number of cases brought against
government-owned or -operated hospitals also increased in the late 1990s
and early 2000s, a category of cases that directly affects the state’s
financial well-being and reputation.11 Compared to the overall increase in
the rate of civil litigation in Japan since the late 1980s—a rise of
approximately twenty-nine percent in district court filings, the bulk of
which involved bad loans and debt collection—the rise of medical
malpractice litigation is dramatic.12
TABLE 1: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS IN JAPAN, 1994–200613
year

new
claims

pending
claims

disposed
claims

1992
1993
1994

371
442
506

1257
1352
1466

364
347
392

percent
settled
(wakai)
--------------

percent resulting
in a judicial
decision
-------------

8. See SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, IJIKANKEISOSHŌ JIKEN NO SHORIJYŌKYŌ OYOBI
HEIKINSHINRIKIKAN [REPORT OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION COMMISSION] (2005),
http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/about/iinkai/izikankei/toukei_01.html
[hereinafter
MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE REPORT 1]; MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT 4, supra note 6; Kazue Nakajima et al.,
Medical Malpractice and Legal Resolution Systems in Japan, 285 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1632, 1632
(2001).
9. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT 1, supra note 8. Cases primarily involve internal medicine
(approximately twenty-five percent of all cases), surgery (approximately twenty percent), and
obstetrics (fifteen percent).
10. For example, over two dozen families of patients injured by heart operations at Tokyo
Women’s Medical University Hospital created the Higaisha Renrakukai and filed both civil and
criminal charges. Patients’ Families to Sue Hospital over Malpractice, DAILY YOMIURI, July 21, 2003.
11. Report: 32 Malpractice Suits Filed During 9-Month Period, DAILY YOMIURI, Jan. 11, 2003.
12. Tom Ginsburg & Glenn Hoetker, The Unreluctant Litigant? An Empirical Analysis of
Japan’s Turn to Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 31, 56 (2006) (arguing that the relatively modest
overall increase in litigation rates (compared to medical malpractice) since the 1980s is evidence of the
importance of institutional, not cultural, barriers to litigation).
13. See SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, REPORT OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION
COMMISSION (2002), http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/about/iinkai/izikankei (last visited Mar. 14,
2008) [hereinafter MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT 3].
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year

new
claims

pending
claims

disposed
claims

1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

488
575
597
632
678
795
824
906
1003
1110
999
913

1528
1603
1673
1723
1832
1936
2038
2075
2043
2149
2086
1860

426
500
527
582
569
691
722
869
1035
1004
1062
1139

percent
settled
(wakai)
46.5
51.8
52.8
49.0
46.9
45.9
44.0
43.8
49.1
46.1
49.8
53.3
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percent resulting
in a judicial
decision
40.4
35.4
36.6
39.9
40.4
44.1
46.3
44.4
39.2
40.3
37.7
35.3

Added to the increase in civil litigation, there has also been a rise in
police reports alleging malpractice.14 Article 21 of the Medical Act (Ishihō) imposes a duty on physicians to notify the police when they observe
what they believe is a “suspicious” death.15 The exact criteria for what
counts as “suspicious” are unclear, and a number of medical societies have
struggled to define the types of cases that should trigger the reporting
requirement. In April 2004, the Supreme Court issued a ruling in a widely
reported case involving a hospital error and subsequent cover-up that
challenged the reporting requirement as a violation of the right against
self-incrimination.16 The Court affirmed the duty to report, but failed to
clarify the types of cases that must be reported. The notoriety of that case
drew attention to the rapid escalation of police reports, which went from
21 cases in 1997, to 124 in 2000, to 248 in 2003.17 In short, the number of
newly filed medical malpractice litigation cases has increased quickly in
Japan, the backlog of pending cases is much larger than in the past, and
deaths that may be the result of malpractice have a greater likelihood of
being reported to the police. Along a number of important dimensions, the
14. For a discussion of the role of criminal law in medical malpractice litigation in Japan, see
Robert B. Leflar & Futoshi Iwata, Medical Error As Reportable Event, As Tort, As Crime: A
Transpacific Comparison, 12 WIDENER L. REV. 189, 219 (2005).
15. Kenichi Yoshida et al., New Investigative Organization Will Be Enacted for Potentially
Therapeutic Deaths in Japan (2005) (unpublished paper, on file with author).
16. Okai v. Japan, 58 KEISHŪ 247 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 13, 2004).
17. Robert B. Leflar & Futoshi Iwata, supra note 14, at 219 fig.2.
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relations between doctors and patients are more “legalized” than they were
just a decade ago.18 The rapid rate of increase in medical malpractice
litigation not only raises the possibility that medical malpractice litigation
could continue unabated, but it also poses questions about why such
litigation has become more common and how its increase should and
could be managed.
III. JAPAN’S LAW OF NEGLIGENCE, THE CIVIL LITIGATION SYSTEM, AND
HOW THEY ARE CHANGING
Those who believe that they have been injured as the result of a
medical error can pursue a legal remedy under the substantive law of torts
(fuhō kōi).19 Tort law in Japan, unlike the plethora of conflicting rules one
finds in different states of the United States, is codified and national, and
the basic legal principle underlying tort-related harms is stated in article
709 of the Civil Code. Based on the nineteenth century German law of
accidents, the article states that “A person who has intentionally or
negligently infringed any right of others, or legally protected interest of
others, shall be liable to compensate any damages resulting in
consequence.”20 As in American tort law, the central elements of a
malpractice claim brought under article 709 are the establishment of a duty
of care (chūi gimu no teido), evidence that the duty was breached (ihan), a
18. In comparison to the United States, the incidence of medical malpractice litigation in Japan is
modest. In 2002, there were approximately 250,000 physicians in Japan (out of a population of 127
million)—159,131 working in hospitals and 90,443 in clinics—who received a total of 606,399,536
outpatient office visits (an average of almost five annual visits per person), and made almost 14
million hospital admissions. Kōsei Tōkei Yōran [Directory of Public Health Statutes] (2002), available
at http://wwwdbtk.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/youran/data16k/2-47.xls. In the United States that same year,
there were 853,000 physicians, a population of almost 290 million, 1,083,500,000 outpatient visits
(3.74 annual visits per person) and close to 34 million hospital admissions. U.S. Census Bureau,
Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2004–2005, at 7, 107, 109, 113 available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical-abstract-04.html (follow hyperlinks under “2004” for
“Section 1: Population” and “Section 3: Health and Nutrition”) (last visited Mar. 9, 2009). Based on
that data, one might expect a malpractice rate in the United States two to four times higher than that in
Japan. In fact, there were more malpractice cases filed in Philadelphia in 2000, 2001, and 2002 than in
all of Japan. The Unified Judicial Sys. of Pa., Pennsylvania Medical Malpractice Case Filings: 2000–
2007, http://www.pacourts.us/Links/Media/MedicalMalpractice/ (follow the “Med Mal Filing
Statewide 2000–2007” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 27, 2008).
19. Medical malpractice claims can be brought under tort or contract law, and frequently lawsuits
include both claims. Ultimately, the legal question is identical—did the provider satisfy the duty of
care, and, if not, did the provider’s breach cause the plaintiff’s injuries? See MARK RAMSEYER &
MINORU NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 67–68 (1999). Practical differences
include a three-year statute of limitations for tort claims versus ten years for contract claims, and
differences in damage awards.
20. MINPŌ [CIVIL CODE], art. 709.
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causal link (inga kankei) between the breach and the harm, and damages
(songai baishō). The crux of a malpractice case is generally the
identification of the applicable standard of care, the determination of
whether or not the defendant provider met the standard, and the analysis of
the causal relationship between the defendant’s actions and the plaintiff’s
injuries.
A great deal depends upon how the standard of care is defined, which
party must bear the burden of proving to the court that the defendant did or
did not exercise due care, and which party is required to show that the
defendant’s actions did or did not cause the plaintiff’s harms. The standard
of care in Japanese malpractice cases is determined with reference to
national rather than local practice.21 With regard to the burden of proof
(shōmei sekinin), Japanese courts treat medical malpractice just like other
tort claims and require plaintiffs to prove the central elements of their
allegations.22 As Japanese academic commentary on the burden of proof in
malpractice claims uniformly asserts, the burden of proof falls on
plaintiffs, and interviews with judges and malpractice attorneys confirm
that plaintiffs are required to establish the prima facie elements of their
claims. Only after they have done so must defendants argue that they met
the standard of care, or that their actions did not cause the alleged harm.23
21. Kiichi Nishino, Iryō Suijyun to Iryō Kankō [Medical Standards and Medical Practice], in
IRYŌ KAGO SOSHŪ HŌ [MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION] 109 (Ōta Yukio ed., 2000).
22. For a discussion of standards of proof in civil and common law jurisdictions, see Kevin M.
Clermont, Standards of Proof in Japan and the United States, 37 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 263, 264 (2004)
(arguing that in civil cases Japanese courts require proof “to a high probability similar to beyond a
reasonable doubt”). See also Yasuhei Taniguchi, The 1996 Code of Civil Procedure of Japan—A
Procedure for the Coming Century?, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 767 (1997). Obtaining evidence in
malpractice cases can be difficult. The Japan Medical Association has successfully fought a law that
would give patients the right to see their medical records. The Medical Practioners Law (Ishi-hō)
requires that physicians create and store charts, but only for five years, and it lacks sanctions for the
alteration of patients’ records. In 2003, the Japanese Diet passed the Kojin Jyōhō Hogo ni Kansuru
Hōritsu. Kojin Jyōhō Hogoni Kansuru Hōritsu [Personal Information Protection Law], Law No. 57 of
2003. Although this law did not address the issue of access to medical records, the Ministry of Health,
Labor, and Welfare (“MHLW”) issued interpretive guidelines that specified the conditions under
which patients in government-operated medical facilities could access their medical records. See
KŌSEIRŌDŌSHŌ, IRYŌ-KAIGO KANKEI JIGYŌSHA NI OKERU KOJIN JYŌHŌ NO TEKISETSUNA
TORIATSUKAI NO TAME NO GAIDORAIN [GUIDELINES FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF PERSONAL
INFORMATION BY EMPLOYEES OF MEDICAL AND ELDERLY CARE FACILITIES] (2004) [hereinafter
KŌSEIRŌDŌSHŌ]. Many patients remain unable to access their records.
23. See, e.g., Yoshihisa Nomi, Medical Liability in Japanese Law, in MODERN TRENDS IN TORT
LAW: DUTCH AND JAPANESE LAW COMPARED 29 (Ewoud Hondious ed., 1999) (describing how
plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases “must prove that the doctor’s conduct fell below the level of the
standard established by law”). For a different view, see RAMSEYER & NAKAZUTO, supra note 19, at
67, who claim that “courts deliberately switch the burden” and impose it on tort defendants (rather
than plaintiffs), who must demonstrate that they met the standard of care or that their actions did not
cause the plaintiff’s harms.

264 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 8:257

In short, by requiring plaintiffs to bear the burden of proof in medical
malpractice cases, Japanese courts effectively limit the number of
malpractice claims that can succeed.
In addition to the specific legal elements of tort malpractice cases,
several long-standing features of the Japanese legal system have a
significant bearing on the initiation and resolution of medical malpractice
claims, and changes to some of those features appear to be a factor in the
increasing prevalence of malpractice litigation. For many years, for
example, the bar association regulated the compensation of attorneys in
Japan. Although the association’s fee schedule has been formally
abolished, it is still a reasonable guide, since many lawyers continue to bill
clients in accordance with the guidelines.24 With the fee schedule formally
eliminated (the bar association argued that it was a restraint on trade),
attorneys are now free to impose contingency fees. Some have reduced
their retainers and added a twenty percent contingency fee, but relatively
few have abandoned up-front payments by plaintiffs for a flat thirty
percent contingency fee arrangement. The ability to pursue malpractice
claims less expensively is likely to increase the number of potential
malpractice claimants. Its impact on attorneys is less clear. Shifting some
of the financial risk of medical malpractice claims to attorneys may
decrease their willingness to handle such cases. But it could also attract
risk-taking attorneys who would not have otherwise worked in the tort law
or malpractice area.
In addition to a retainer, plaintiffs have long been required to pay a
case filing fee (tesūryō) to the court. The fee is based on the amount of the
claimed damages and is determined as described in Table 2.25
24. In malpractice (and other civil) cases, according to the guidelines, plaintiffs cover their
attorney’s out-of-pocket costs and pay a retainer. For cases in which plaintiffs seek less than
¥3,000,000, they pay a retainer of eight percent; between ¥3,000,000 and ¥30,000,000, the retainer is
five percent; between ¥30,000,000 and ¥300,000,000, plaintiffs pay three percent; and over
¥300,000,000, the fee is two percent. See JAPAN FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS, INTRODUCTORY
PAMPHLET 24 (2000), available at http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/about/img/jfba.pdf. In addition to
the retainer, attorneys could (and often did) add a thirty percent premium to the fee, and if they won
the case they would double the initial retainer. Id.
25. YOSHITAKA WADA & SHŌICHI MAEDA, IRYŌ FUNSŌ: MEDICARU KONFUREKUTO
MANÉJIMENTO NO TEIAN [CONFLICT OVER MEDICAL TREATMENT: A PROPOSAL FOR MEDICAL
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT] 142 (2001).
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TABLE 2: DETERMINATION OF CASE FILING FEE
Damages Sought by Plaintiff
Less than ¥300,000
¥300,000 to ¥1 million
¥1 million to ¥3 million
¥3 million to ¥10 million
¥10 million to ¥100 million
¥100 million to ¥1 billion
Over ¥1 billion

Amount Paid to the Court
¥500 for each ¥50,000
¥400 for each ¥50,000
¥700 for each ¥100,000
¥1000 for each ¥200,000
¥1000 for each ¥250,000
¥3000 for each ¥1 million
¥10,000 for each ¥5 million

The filing fee, along with the retainer, requires a significant investment
by potential malpractice plaintiffs. This investment is particularly difficult
for those who are young and of modest means, who are the most likely to
sue over so-called “bad baby” cases—those involving a child born with a
serious neurological, physical, or intellectual impairment. In the United
States, such cases are particularly attractive to attorneys and often lead to
generous jury awards. But in Japan, even though cases involving impaired
newborns represent some of the highest court-awarded damages in the
malpractice area,26 few such cases reach the courts because new parents,
generally in their late twenties or early thirties, are unable to afford the
approximately forty thousand dollars needed to initiate a one million
dollar case. So far, only modest changes have been made to the filing fee
requirement, and it remains a disincentive to litigation.
Likewise, the determination of civil damages in Japan also suppresses
litigation. There are no juries in civil cases, which eliminates at least some
of the uncertainty experienced by parties to medical malpractice claims in
the United States.27 Moreover, damage calculations by Japanese courts
result in awards that are both modest and predictable.28 No punitive
damages are permitted in Japan, and cases that might lead to such damages
26. The initial payments in malpractice cases steadily decrease as a plaintiff’s age increases, a
function of the decrease in damages requested. Id. at 143. For plaintiffs ages 0–19, the average sum of
attorney retainer and filing fees is ¥3,149,119; from ages 20–39, ¥2,297,272; for those 40–59,
¥2,280,118; and for those 60–79 years old, ¥1,876,676. Id.
27. For a discussion of the predictability of Japanese courts, see Mark J. Ramseyer, Reluctant
Litigant Revisited: Rationality and Disputes in Japan, 12 J. JAPENESE STUD. 111, 114 (1988). For an
analysis of using juries in malpractice cases, see Yoshihani Kawabata, Shimin no Shihō no Jitsugen no
tame hi-Hōsō-Ichigen, Bai-Sanshin Seido to Kokumin Shuken [The Realization of Citizen’s Justice—
Common Training of Legal Profession, Jury System and Lay Judge System, and Popular Sovereignty],
5 GAKUJUTSU NO DōKō 27, 30–31 (2000).
28. Leflar & Iwata, supra note 14, at 200.

266 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 8:257

in the United States are generally handled by the Japanese criminal law.29
Compensatory damages as well as payments for pain and suffering in
medical malpractice closely follow those for personal injuries that result
from automobile accidents. Both types of damages are determined with
reference to what is colloquially known as the “Red Book,” a bright red
guide to traffic accident harms published annually by one of Tokyo’s
lawyers’ associations.30 The Red Book contains hundreds of traffic
accident diagrams that help courts and insurance adjusters evaluate the
cause of and responsibility for particular types of crashes, as well as
actuarial tables that provide guidelines and illustrations for the calculation
of damages. They include “active” damages (sekkyoku songai), such as the
cost of hospitalization, massage therapy, visits to hot springs, and the like,
and “passive” damages (shōkyoku songai), which refer to losses like
missed salary.31 The Red Book also offers a relatively simple approach to
pain and suffering damages (isharyo), providing a matrix that takes into
account the type of injury; the length of hospitalization; as well as the age,
gender, and wage-earning status of the plaintiff, among other factors.32
Unlike the individualized and highly variable pain and suffering damages
in U.S. tort litigation, in Japan the reliance on a standard set of factors
leads to a modest variance between the lowest and highest payments.
As a result, plaintiffs’ demands for damages are likely to approximate
those suggested by the Red Book. Damages in medical malpractice cases
in Japan are thus more predictable and more modest than in the United
States. As a result, plaintiffs are reluctant to invest in significant retainers
and filing fees when winning their case leads to a limited payout, perhaps
one they could have negotiated outside of court.
Another structural factor that contributes to the increase in malpractice
litigation is the growing number of attorneys willing to take malpractice
cases. In part, the availability of attorneys is a consequence of the
contraction of other types of legal work in the 1990s, particularly real
estate, which kept many solo practitioners busy during the economic boom
of the 1980s. Additionally, a generation of lawyers who came of age
during the 1960s and embraced medical malpractice work as part of a
29. For a thorough discussion of the criminal law approach to medical malpractice in Japan, see
generally id.
30. TOKYO SAN BENGOSHIGAI KŌTSŪ JIKO SHORI IINKAI [TOKYO’S THREE BAR ASSOCIATIONS
TRAFFIC ACCIDENT COMM.], MINJI KŌTSŪ JIKO SOSHŌ SONGAI BAISHŌGAKU SANNTEI KIJYUN [CIVIL
TRAFFIC ACCIDENT LITIGATION] (2001).
31. Id. at 1–56.
32. Id. at 57–72.
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belief in patients’ rights has reached full maturity.33 That generation has
successfully passed on its commitment to representing plaintiffs in
malpractice cases to an increasing number of younger attorneys, some of
whom now have their own practices, and some of whom work in firms but
do pro bono work on behalf of the victims of medical accidents.34 In fact,
there appears to be a correlation between the increase in the total number
of attorneys in Japan and rising rates of medical malpractice claims. As
demonstrated in Table 3, the number of attorneys in Japan has been
steadily increasing since 1960, and between 1990 and 2005 the lawyer
population increased more than fifty percent, whereas the overall
population grew by less than five percent.
TABLE 3: NUMBER OF LICENSED ATTORNEYS AND TOTAL POPULATION OF
JAPAN35
Year
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005

Attorneys Population of Japan
6,321
94,301,623
7,082
99,209,137
8,478
104,665,171
10,115
111,939,643
11,441
117,060,396
12,604
121,048,923
13,800
123,611,167
15,108
125,570,246
17,126
126,925,843
21,185
127,760,000

Even more dramatic is the increase in the number of women licensed to
practice law, shown in Table 4. Not only do they often find it difficult or
unattractive to work in traditional firms, but for some, medical malpractice
33. Eric A. Feldman, Patients’ Rights, Citizen’s Movements, and Japanese Legal Culture, in
COMPARING LEGAL CULTURES 227 (David Nelkin ed., 1997).
34. Leflar & Iwata, supra note 14, at 202 n.46.
35. See JAPAN FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 24; MINISTRY OF INTERNAL
AFFAIRS & COMMUNC’NS, FINAL REPORT OF THE 2000 POPULATION CENSUS, available at
http://www.stat.go.jp/English/data/kokusei/2000/final/hyodai.htm (follow hyperlinks for “Statistical
Table List,” then “Statistical tables presented in the report,” then “Population, Population Change,
Area and Population Density of Japan: 1920 to 2000”) (last visited Oct. 28, 2008); MINISTRY OF
INTERNAL AFFAIRS & COMMC’NS., INTERCENSAL ADJUSTMENT OF CURRENT POPULATION ESTIMATES
(2000–2005), available at http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/jinsui/2-3.htm (follow “II Statistical
Tables” hyperlink; then follow “Population by Sex for Japan—Total population, Japanese population
(as of the First Day of Each Month)” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 18, 2009).
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has a special appeal. Women are generally the primary care givers in
Japanese households and are more likely to have frequent (and potentially
negative) interactions with the health care system. This reality may lead
them to make medical malpractice their professional focus.36
TABLE 4: NUMBER OF LICENSED FEMALE ATTORNEYS IN JAPAN37
Year
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005

Female Attorneys
42
79
179
299
420
587
766
996
1,530
2,648

In a variety of ways, therefore, the structure of the Japanese legal
profession and the substance of Japanese tort law affect the frequency and
outcomes of malpractice lawsuits.38 Although none of the factors
described above are targeted specifically at medical malpractice litigation,
each of them has an impact on malpractice lawsuits, and certain recent
changes to them appear to be altering both the rate of malpractice filings
and how they are resolved.
IV. REFORMING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION: THE PACE AND
ACCURACY OF JUSTICE
Of equal or perhaps greater importance, several structural changes were
recently implemented that are aimed directly at two issues of particular
importance to medical malpractice litigants—the length of time it takes for
claims to be resolved, and the accuracy of court judgments that deal with
36. Another group that may become central to malpractice litigation in Japan is physicians who
matriculate at one of Japan’s new postgraduate law schools. At one school (Omiya Law School) ten of
eighty first year students in 2004 had medical degrees. Attorneys with specialized medical knowledge
are likely to be attracted to legal practices that build on their unique skills.
37. See JAPAN FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 24.
38. Demographic changes may also play a role, and it is possible that elderly individuals with
time and money are more likely to sue.
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technical scientific and medical issues. William Gladstone’s maxim that
“justice delayed is justice denied” has particular salience in Japan. The
languid pace of trials, in which cases are scheduled to be heard
discontinuously (e.g., one day each month) rather than from start to finish,
has long been identified as one reason why Japanese plaintiffs find
litigation an unsatisfying approach to conflict resolution. Justice officials
and others involved in Japan’s legal reform activities, acutely aware of
such concerns, made the acceleration of court proceedings a reform
priority. But speed has the potential to work against accuracy, particularly
in cases that require detailed scientific or medical knowledge. It is perhaps
not surprising, therefore, that two recent changes bearing directly on
medical malpractice, the development of a new system for calling expert
witnesses and the creation of specialized medical courts, are targeted at
speeding up malpractice trials and ensuring that judgments in such cases
are as accurate as possible.
Data on the pace of civil justice underscore the view that the
infrequency of medical malpractice litigation might in part be the result of
the length of time it takes courts to resolve malpractice claims. As
illustrated in Table 5, between 1994 and 2006 such claims took far longer
to resolve than other civil claims. Although the pace of resolving both
malpractice and non-malpractice claims has increased over that period—
dramatically so in the case of malpractice—in 2006 it still took an average
of 25.1 months for the average malpractice case to move from filing to
final judgment in the district courts (the first-resort trial court for such
cases), and far longer for appealed cases.
TABLE 5: LENGTH OF TIME BETWEEN THE FILING AND FINAL JUDGMENT
OF MALPRACTICE CASES AND CIVIL CASES IN DISTRICT COURTS,
1994–2006 (IN MONTHS)39
Year
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

Medical Malpractice Cases All Civil Cases
41.4
9.8
38.8
10.1
37.0
10.2
36.3
10.0
35.1
9.3
34.5
9.2
35.6
8.8

39. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT 1, supra note 5.
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2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
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Medical Malpractice Cases All Civil Cases
32.6
8.5
30.9
8.3
27.7
8.2
27.3
8.3
26.9
8.4
25.1
7.8

The fact that a typical malpractice case takes more than three times
longer than a civil case to be resolved increasingly came to be seen as an
unfair barrier to malpractice litigants. Indeed, the government’s Justice
System Reform Council, which has since 1999 been at the forefront of
reforming Japan’s legal system to make it more accessible to its citizens,
has taken a particular interest in accelerating the pace of civil claims
generally, and malpractice specifically. In its politically influential 2001
report, it advocated the implementation of a variety of changes that would
improve the processing of civil claims and cut in half the amount of time it
takes to resolve medical malpractice conflicts. Two significant reforms
have taken aim at those goals: the creation of a new type of expert witness
system and the establishment of specialized courts.40
A. Reforming the Expert Witness System
Japan’s expert witness system, similar to those of France and Germany,
is set out in article 212 of the Code of Civil Procedure.41 The primary
function of experts in Japan is to serve the court, generally consisting of a
panel of three judges. Parties may also hire their own experts. Experts are
generally identified as predisposed toward plaintiffs or defendants, and in
Japan many more are available to defendants.
Until recently, in malpractice and other claims, parties who believed
that they needed expert testimony submitted a motion to the court, and if
the presiding judge agreed, the court would contact the appropriate
experts.42 It took on average 133.3 days for an expert to be successfully
40. JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM
COUNCIL: FOR A JUSTICE SYSTEM TO SUPPORT JAPAN IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2001), available at
www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/judiciary/2001/0612report.html.
41. In France and Germany, judges can select individuals from a list of possible experts that is
assembled annually by the court; no such list exists in Japan.
42. Between 1989 and 1998, experts were used in 22.5% of medical malpractice cases, and the
plaintiffs’ chances of prevailing in malpractice litigation involving experts increased from 29.9% to
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recruited, a delay that resulted in part from the lack of a single, simple
procedure for expert identification. Courts sometimes asked medical
societies or academic medical departments for recommendations, but
doing so was generally a ten-month process.43 Parties could submit a list
of potential experts to the court, but the opposing party was allowed to vet
them, which was time consuming. Moreover, as a result of medical
hierarchy and paternalism many experts, once identified, refused to advise
courts on medical issues.44 Senior physicians occupy the top of carefully
crafted pyramids of power, and classmates, members of the same
professional organizations, co-workers, and others with professional or
personal ties were reluctant to get involved in cases that may make them
adversaries. Financial considerations rarely offered a sufficient incentive
to overcome such reluctance. The cost of expertise varied with the
complexity of a case, but was generally between three hundred thousand
and five hundred thousand yen, and almost never over one million yen.45
Once a court secured the participation of an expert, the fee was paid to the
court by the party that initially requested expert involvement (though this
fee was ultimately paid by the losing party).
After experts agreed to serve and take an oath, the court provided them
with pleadings and other relevant legal and medical documents, and
requested either a written or (less frequently) oral report. Parties could
submit written questions and seek clarification of written reports. They
could also cross-examine experts who gave their reports orally. Experts
who provided false testimony were subject to imprisonment for up to ten
years.46
1. The “Conference” Approach
On January 8, 2003, the Tokyo District Court invited three physicians
to discuss the merits of a malpractice claim involving a patient who
39.1%. Noriko Sakamoto et al., The Use of Experts in Medical Malpractice Litigation in Japan, 42
MED. SCI. L. 200, 202 (2002).
43. Ayuma Murata, Kantei ni tsuite [On Expert Opinion], 1023 HANREI TIMES, Apr. 2000, at 18;
Tokyo district court practice dai-ichi committee, Kantel Jikō no Kettei Nado ni Muketa [Committee on
Standardizing Expert Opinions], 1018 HANREI TIMES, Mar. 2000, at 39.
44. Sakamoto et al., supra note 42, at 201.
45. Tokyo Chihō Saibansho Iryō Soshō Taisaku Iinkai [Tokyo Dist. Court Med. Malpractice
Comm.], Tokyo Chisai Iryō Shūchūbu ni Okeru Iryō Soshō no Shinri Jijyō ni Tsuite [Circumstances of
the Medical Malpractice Trial in the Tokyo District Court Medical Malpractice Consolidation
Division], 1105 HANREI TIMES, Jan. 1, 2003, at 43 [hereinafter Circumstances of Medical Malpractice
Trial].
46. KEIHŌ [PENAL CODE], art. 171.

272 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 8:257

underwent a jaw operation and died of heart failure.47 The architects of this
new “conference” method (tōron hōshiki ni yoru kantei) of consulting
medical experts cite several advantages over the current system, including
convenience (experts may convene via closed circuit television rather than
traveling to the courthouse),48 speed (experts will have only two months to
review medical charts and conferences are limited to a single day),49 and
objectivity (bringing several experts together may reduce their tendency to
defend the actions of other medical providers). In addition, experts prepare
only a single page of notes prior to a conference, making it much more
difficult for the parties to offer a detailed (and potentially aggressive)
rebuttal. For those who avoid serving as expert witnesses because they do
not want to be subjected to withering cross-examination, the new system
should provide some welcome relief.50
2. Expert Commissioners
The most innovative and controversial reform involving experts is the
creation of a group of special court advisors. As stated by the Judicial
System Reform Council, “study should be given . . . to the manner in
which new systems for expert participation in litigation should be
introduced, in which non-lawyer experts in each specialized field become
involved in all or part of trials, from the standpoint of their own
specialized expertise, as expert commissioners (senmon iin) to support
judges.”51 Such experts will be called directly by the court and will assist
in identifying and analyzing disputed issues, facilitating settlement,
rendering opinions on technical issues, and evaluating evidence, among
other functions. In contrast to traditional expert witnesses, expert
commissioners will work exclusively as advisors to the court, and their
opinions will not be considered formal evidence at trial. For this new
system to succeed, it will have to overcome the view held by some
47. Ishi 3-nin, Touron Houshiki de Kantei [With Three Physicians, a Conference Method of
Experts], ASAHI SHINBUN, Jan. 8, 2003. As of November 2003, the Tokyo District Court has only used
the conference method on four occasions.
48. Karute Kantei Nado TV Kaigi De, NIKKEI SHINBUN, Apr. 18, 2002.
49. In the current system, a single expert may take many months, or even a year, to render an
opinion.
50. See Noriko Yamamoto, Slow Malpractice Suits Under the Knife, MAINICHI SHIMBUN, Mar.
20, 2000. Under recent amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure, experts first present their views,
followed by questions from the judge, then the party requesting an expert has the floor, and lastly the
other party speaks.
51. American courts have also experimented with scientific advisors. Robert L. Rabin,
Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049 (2000).
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members of the plaintiff’s bar that physicians and other medical experts
will almost inevitably internalize a pro-defense bias. Otherwise, plaintiffs’
attorneys are likely to oppose any form of expert involvement in medical
malpractice cases that does not depend upon their explicit approval of
every expert involved in a case.
B. Creating Specialized Medical Malpractice Courts
In addition to the focus on how outside experts can assist courts,
simultaneous efforts have aimed to help sitting judges understand and
assess the input of experts. Most civil cases are randomly assigned. The
Tokyo District Court, for example, has fifty divisions, each staffed by a
panel of three judges. Filed cases are assigned to a division, which is
responsible for the case until it settles or is tried. Instead of randomly
assigning medical malpractice cases, several of Japan’s most important
courts—including the district courts in Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, and
Chiba—have recently created “consolidation divisions” (shūchūbu) that
specialize in malpractice claims.52 Since 2001, for example, four of the
fifty divisions of the Tokyo District Court have been assigned all of the
malpractice cases filed (approximately two hundred). The hope is that
judges in those divisions will acquire expertise that will better enable them
to handle technical medical issues.53 Thus, in some cases judges will have
the ability to identify and engage with experts on their own, and in other
cases they will be able to use their acquired expertise to comprehend and
decide malpractice claims.
An analysis of the Tokyo District Court’s shūchūbu that looks at 228
cases disposed of after October 1, 2002, shows that 36% (82 cases) were
decided by the court’s specialized judges, and 127 (55.7%) were settled
through mediation.54 Of the 228 cases decided by a judge, plaintiffs won
40.2% (82 of 228) and lost 59.8% (49 of 228).55 Moreover, cases handled
52. Such divisions have been endorsed by the Judicial System Reform Council, as well as by
attorneys who specialize in medical malpractice. See Tatsuo Kuroyanagi, Senmon Soshō no Kantei ni
Tsuite [Appraisal in the Special Litigation], 120 HŌ NO SHIHAI 83 (2001); Manabu Yamana & Hiroshi
Ōshima, [Current Trends in Medical Malpractice Litigation], 54(2) JIYŪ TO SEIGI 14–21 (2003). For a
detailed discussion of consolidation bureaus, see Circumstances of Medical Malpractice Trial, supra
note 45.
53. Judges are regularly rotated; few postings last more than five years, and many are for only
three. To acquire a useful degree of medical expertise and use it in medical cases, judges will probably
need more time than is possible under the current system of judicial administration.
54. Yuri Kamata, Tetsuya Yamada & Takaitsu Ogawa, Tokyo Chisai Iryō Shūchūbu ni Okeni
Jiken no Gaikyō [An Analysis of Cases Handled by the Tokyo District Court’s Medical Malpractice
Consolidation Division], 213 MINJIHŌ JŌHŌ 17 (2004).
55. Yamamoto, supra note 50.
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by the medical court appear to proceed far more rapidly than malpractice
cases channeled through the regular court system, with 35% of them
disposed of within one year; the average case takes less than 17 months,
making the medical court 10 months faster than the national average.56
Each of the four specialized medical divisions receives an average of three
to five new cases each month.
TABLE 6: TOKYO DISTRICT COURT, SPECIALIZED MEDICAL COURT
(SHŪCHŪBU), 2001-200757
Year
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

New Claims Pending Claims Disposed Claims
126
162
22
192
256
98
180
262
164
218
334
154
195
337
191
194
294
238
201
280
215

Despite the effort to facilitate the involvement of experts in malpractice
cases and create specialized medical courts, some judges and
commentators argue that courts should decide a wide array of such cases
without consulting experts.58 Judge Fukuda Takahisa of the Tokyo District
Court, for example, points out that the internet has enabled individuals to
learn a great deal about medical issues and notes that expert opinions
almost always conflict. Consequently, he believes that judges should be
proactive in learning about medical issues and trust their own judgment.59
Suzuki Toshihiro, a prominent plaintiff’s attorney, agrees that attorneys
and judges can often rely on their own understanding of the medical issues
when determining whether malpractice occurred.60 In short, at the same
time that specialized courts have become operational and judges are
working to facilitate the participation of experts in medical cases, some
56. Id.
57. Cases were accepted by the Specialized Medical Court beginning in April 2001. Special
Medical Court Data: 2004–2007 (provided by Judge Keiko Mitsuyoshi) (on file with author).
58. Yamana & Ōshima, supra note 52.
59. Hirogaru, ‘Kantei Hanare,’ MAINICHI SHIMBUN, Apr. 16, 2002, at 3.
60. Id.
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influential legal elites are claiming that such expertise is overrated and
should play a less prominent role in medical malpractice cases.
V. EXOGENOUS INFLUENCES ON THE RISE OF MALPRACTICE LAWSUITS
In addition to the structural aspects of the civil litigation system that
have affected malpractice, a set of factors exogenous to the legal system is
particularly relevant to the rise in malpractice claims. First, the increasing
number of people who are taking their medical providers to court is at
least in part a result of the erosion of public trust in elites generally and
physicians in particular. Public opinion surveys on such matters can be
unreliable, but the available data support the conclusion that public trust in
doctors has been declining. When a 1978 survey by the Yomiuri Shimbun
newspaper, for example, asked patients about their level of trust in
doctors, 21% said that they had a high level of trust and 68.2% said that
they had a moderate degree of trust, with only 6.8% expressing some
distrust and 0.8% saying that they do not trust doctors at all.61 A decade
later, in 1988, a survey by the Asahi Shimbun newspaper found that 21%
of people responded positively to the statement “I don’t really trust my
doctor” (amari shinrai shiteinai); that number dropped to 20% in 1992,
increased to 28% in 1996 and to 30% in 2000, and settled at 26% in
2002.62 This trend was underscored by a 2003 Yomiuri Shimbun survey of
3,000 people showing that 77% were very or somewhat anxious about
being the victim of medical malpractice. Overall, the surveys reveal a
gradual but clear decrease in trust and increase in distrust that is
particularly dramatic among those between the ages of 20 and 40.
Hospital administrators have gotten the message and have been
experimenting with different ways of regaining the allegiance of patients.
Some, like Shizuoka Prefecture’s Seirei Hamamatsu General Hospital,
have started to talk about patients as “customers,” and have begun to offer
services that until recently would have been unthinkable.63 Seirei
Hamamatsu employs several doorwomen to greet patients, open their car
61. Naikakutu seitu kōhō shitsu [Government IR Department Cabinet Ministry], Iryō ni Kansuru
Yoron Chōsa [Poll on Medical Treatment], http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/s47/S48-02-47-15.html (last
visited Mar. 26, 2009).
62. Akiko Nakamura, Zenkoku Yoron Chōsa Shōhō: Isha wo Shinrai Rokuwari Jyūni Nenkan de
Jiwajiwa Teika [Detailed Report of the National Public Opinion Survey], 147 ASAHI SOKEN REPŌTO
82, (2000) (1988, 1992, 1996, and 2000 data); Zenkoku Yoron Chōsa Shōhō [Detailed Report of the
National Public Opinion Survey], 156 ASAHI SŌKEN REPŌTO 170 (2002) (2002 data).
63. Mami Tsukahara, Hospitals Trying to Overcome Distrust, DAILY YOMIURI, Oct. 11, 2004.
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doors, and treat them as if they were entering a luxury hotel.64 To some
extent, the erosion of trust has been fueled by the media and its intensive
coverage of providers who have engaged in outrageous conduct
(subjecting the wrong patients to high-risk procedures, altering medical
records to cover-up evidence of mistakes, etc.), triggering public criticism
of the medical system.65 From this perspective, increases in malpractice
litigation reflect a change in how people regard medical practitioners, and
elites more generally, who are no longer perceived to be atop a rigid social
hierarchy that makes them immune from legal attack.
Second, the financial needs of victims may be growing because of a
retrenchment in benefits offered through national health care and other
parts of the social welfare system. With higher co-pays resulting in higher
out-of-pocket health care costs, those with injuries that they believe were
caused by negligent medical care may be more likely to sue in order to
recoup their expenses. This tendency was exacerbated by Japan’s “lost
decade” of economic stagnation in the 1990s; people were being asked to
bear greater health care costs at a time when they had less money than they
did ten years earlier.66
Third, as briefly mentioned earlier, media coverage of medical
malpractice litigation has brought public attention to suing doctors. Both
lawyers and patients, as well as judges, government officials, and others,
are influenced by the media. In the late 1990s, media coverage of
malpractice cases soared. A database that tracks stories in Japan’s leading
newspapers indicates that in 1990 there were only 161 stories about
malpractice; that number jumped to 413 in 1997, 1258 in 1999, and
between 2000 and 3000 per year since.67 The increase was marked by a
large number of stories written about a number of now-notorious medical
mishaps, like a mix-up involving two patients who received the wrong
surgery (the lung patient received heart surgery, and vice versa), and the
cover-up of a mistake involving a faulty artificial heart-lung machine.68 In
addition, litigation brought by hemophiliacs against both the Ministry of
Health, Labor and Welfare (“MHLW”) and pharmaceutical companies in
the 1990s created a political scandal that was widely viewed as an example
of how innocent and helpless people are mistreated at the hands of the
64. Id.
65. Leflar & Iwata, supra note 14, at 197.
66. Interview with Kuroyanagi Tatsuo in Tokyo, Japan (July 2005) (on file with author).
67. Yasushi Kodama, Iryō anzen: How Safe is Safe Enough?, 1339 JURISUTO 67, 73 fig.2 (2007).
68. Yoshiharu Kawabata, Health-Related Litigation in Japan (Apr. 28, 2006) (unpublished paper
presented at the Dickinson College Symposium on Health, Law and Justice in Asia).
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medical establishment (and was instrumental to the success of the lawsuit
and settlement of hepatitis C claims in 2007).69 Such stories depict medical
malpractice litigation as a morally just cause, not the impecunious
scheming of greedy parties, and pique the interest of the general public as
well as attorneys and potential claimants.
Interestingly, at least from the American perspective, criticism of
overly generous awards to plaintiffs, spiraling insurance premiums, greedy
plaintiff’s attorneys, or increases in claims that lead to undeserving
lawsuits are virtually unknown in Japan. When an official publicly voiced
such sentiments—like when a Deputy Minister at MHLW exclaimed that
there are “growing numbers of money hungry weirdoes trying to get rich
by blaming the medical world”70—the outburst led to demands for his
resignation, not a groundswell of support. According to media accounts,
the rising rate of malpractice claims reflects a growing number of medical
accidents, not illegitimate lawsuits, insurance company gauging, or
ambulance-chasing attorneys.71
69. Eric A. Feldman, Blood Justice: Courts, Conflict, and Compensation in Japan, France, and
the United States, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 651, 682 (2000).
70. Malpractice Victims Demand Vice-Minister’s Dismissal, MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, Apr. 29,
2003.
71. Regulators have undertaken a number of initiatives targeted at reducing the frequency of
medical errors. Officials have created a mandatory accident reporting system, for example, that is
managed by the Japan Council for Quality Health Care (“JCQHC”). Japan Council for Quality Health
Care 2005, http://jcghc.or.jp/html/English/about_jcqhc.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2007). The Japan
Board of Medical Societies has also set up a reporting system and is developing guidelines for
disciplining doctors who have been convicted in criminal malpractice cases. Specialists Group to
Tackle Malpractice, DAILY YOMIURI, Mar. 23, 2005. The government has sought to eliminate poorly
performing doctors by beefing up the Medical Ethics Council, a ten-member group dominated by
doctors and former Ministry bureaucrats. The Council’s narrow mandate only allows it to discipline
physicians (a) charged with professional negligence that results in death, (b) convicted of a criminal
offense, or (c) who misappropriate funds by fraudulently submitting claims for government
reimbursement. Since 1971, it has revoked only sixty licenses, none due to malpractice. To improve
the Council’s performance, the Ministry has charged it with meeting four times per year (rather than
two), and has appointed new members trained in law and journalism. Menkyo Torikeshi [Invalidating
Licenses], MAINICHI SHIMBUN, June 26, 2003. Finally, various efforts are underway to improve the
performance of physicians. The Japan Board of Medical Specialties announced in early 2005 that it
was considering the creation of a licensing system that would be linked to the reporting of medical
accidents. The MHLW is considering a revision to the Medical Practitioner’s Law (Ishi-hō) that would
require the retraining of physicians who commit medical errors. Health Ministry Plans to Retrain
Incompetent Docs, DAILY YOMIURI, Feb. 21, 2005. Similarly, the Japan Medical Association is
requiring providers who have been the subject of more than three medical malpractice complaints to
undergo retraining. Todōfuke Ishikai Ijifunsō tantō riji jijōsayōkasseikatantōriji Gōdō renrakukaigi ryō
to shitsu no kōjō ni muke, kakki teki na ketsudan [Joint Meeting of Directors of Prefectual Medical
Associations in Charge of Medical Malpractice Conflict and Directors in Charge of Self-Cleaning
Activation Made a Landmark Decision to Improve the Quality of Medical Care], NICHII NEWS, June 5,
2005, available at http://www.med.or.jp/nichinews/n170605a.html.
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In sum, together with structural changes (discussed in Sections III and
IV) that have affected the frequency of medical malpractice litigation, a
variety of exogenous factors have contributed to (and been affected by) the
rise in malpractice claims. A cycle has emerged in which more malpractice
litigation triggers more media coverage of underperforming physicians;
more media coverage negatively influences the public’s view of elites; and
a lower regard for elites, combined with fewer barriers to litigation,
contributes to the willingness of people to sue. The result is both an
increase in the number of malpractice claims and a weakening of whatever
normative barriers may have inhibited litigation. As structural
impediments to litigation are lifted, cultural constraints are weakened as
well, and what occurs is both a rise in litigation rates and a changed view
of litigation. The relatively small number of medical malpractice claims
suggests caution in using them as the basis for a broad claim about law
and society in Japan. Nonetheless, if one views the trend in malpractice
litigation as indicative of what is occurring in other areas of civil
litigation—and the aggregate data reported by Tom Ginsburg and Glenn
Hoetker offers some support for that view72—it appears that Japan is
currently experiencing an important shift in the role of tort law in the lives
of its citizens.
VI. A NEW ERA OF JAPANESE TORT LAW: THE LURE OF THE COURTS
It is easy to imagine the many ways in which Japanese legal and
political elites could have utilized tried-and-true methods to ensure that
patient complaints about substandard medical care would rarely end up in
court. They could have raised filing fees; made hiring experts to testify
about the standard of care more difficult; randomly assigned malpractice
cases to judges with little experience handling technical medical matters,
thus ensuring delay; created attractive alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms that were fast, cheap, and generous; placed tighter limits on
damages; and more. One need not look far to find examples of statecreated barriers to tort-based litigation that channel potential litigants away
from the courts toward extra-judicial forms of redress. Such alternative
forums have been a favored way of handling conflict, and may well have
been an effective way of handling the rise in malpractice lawsuits.73
When the number of claims relating to automobile accidents began to
escalate in the postwar era, for example, the government passed legislation
72. Ginsburg & Hoetker, supra note 12, at 36–37.
73. JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 40.
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in 1955 that required all vehicle owners to carry a minimum level of
insurance (thirty million yen by the early 1990s) and stipulated that the
owners were liable for all damages unless they could prove that (1) they
were not negligent; (2) a third party, or the accident victim, was negligent;
and (3) the owner’s car was not defective. To collect, parties followed a
finely grained procedure under which they consulted with a government
traffic accident counselor, an insurance company representative, or a
member of the bar association; the claim was evaluated; and payment was
tendered. If parties were displeased with the settlement, they would go to a
Traffic Accident Dispute Resolution Center. Claims over auto accidents
ended up in court for two reasons—if complainants were unhappy about
the settlement resolution, or if they initially demanded more of a payout
than insurance would cover. In effect, the law channeled disputes through
an administrative process that rejected the negligence standard and instead
held vehicle owners strictly liable for auto accident-related harms. The
result was a system in which most accident victims would recover, while
imposing limited transaction costs and providing modest, capped damages.
Disgruntled accident victims could always go to court and rely on
traditional tort principles, but had to accept a significantly lower likelihood
of recovery (and higher adjudication costs) than that enjoyed by holders of
administratively processed claims.
Disputes over environmental harms also illustrate how tort claims have
been channeled away from the courts. In a series of cases brought to the
courts in the 1960s and early 1970s, plaintiffs relied on tort law principles
and achieved a number of significant political and legal victories. As a
consequence, the government created an extrajudicial mechanism to divert
cases from the courts. Under the 1973 Law for the Compensation of
Pollution Related Health Injury,74 claimants can collect damages without
proving a causal link between the existence of a pollutant and the
emergence of health harms. In place of causation, claimants are permitted
to show the administrators of the compensation fund (in the MHLW) that
there is a statistical correlation between a particular disease and a
particular type of pollution.75 The showing is based on epidemiological
data that relieves claimants of the burden of proving specific causation so
long as they can establish a general correlation between the discharge of
the allegedly polluting substance and the outbreak of disease.76 As a result,
74. Kōgai Kenkō Higai no Hoshō ni Kansuru Hōritsu [Law for the Compensation of Pollution
Related Health Injury], Law No. 111 of 1973.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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those who consider themselves victims of environmental pollution
generally rely on non-tort rules and seek damages from the
bureaucratically managed compensation system rather than through torts
and courts.
Auto accidents and environmental harms are hardly the only areas in
which personal injury compensation has been diverted away from the
courts.77 Although it is difficult to precisely identify the government’s
motivations for creating extra-judicial, non-tort remedies for certain
personal injuries, one can make certain observations about the
consequences of such an approach. For one, it is clear that the reliance on
extrajudicial approaches to personal harms has limited the number of cases
brought to the courts and made the government a crucial actor in the
processing and resolution of tort-related claims.78 In addition,
administrative schemes in Japan have taken one of the goals of U.S. tort
law—compensation—and made it the foundation of its system for
managing accidental injuries. The U.S. experience, in contrast, has
relatively few administrative compensation schemes, and litigation of
personal injury claims is far more common.
In the area of medical malpractice as well, extra-judicial dispute
resolution and compensation, especially the Japan Medical Association’s
(“JMA’s”) liability claims management system, has been used to manage
injuries caused by malpractice.79 More than half of Japanese physicians are
members of the JMA, and most of them purchase membership bundled
with malpractice insurance.80 The JMA’s malpractice insurance is priced
at less than one thousand dollars per year, regardless of practice area, and
77. Conflicts over injuries involving pharmaceutical products are another example. The seminal
dispute in this area involved a group of people suffering from a neurological disorder called subacute
myelo-optico neuropathy, or SMON. As a direct consequence of a Kanazawa District Court decision,
in 1979 the Ministry of Health and Welfare created the Adverse Drug Reaction Fund (ADRF, also
known as the Drug Side-Effects Injuries Relief and Research Promotion Fund Act, and as the Relief
Fund for Injuries Caused by the Side Effects of Medicines), administered by the government but
financed through contributions by the pharmaceutical industry. All claims are evaluated by a group
that operates under the auspices of the Ministry, and payments cover medical expenses, nursing
expenses, a living allowance, and a pension or a lump sum to surviving family members. By 1995, for
example, 1714 thalidomide-related claims had been paid, for a total of 4.7 billion yen (over 40 million
dollars). Other related funds, like that created by the Innoculation Act of 1948, amended in 1977,
provide avenues of redress for children who suffer from the side effects of compulsory vaccination.
78. See FRANK UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN (1987).
79. Japan’s approach differs from U.S.-style medical screening panels in numerous ways (the
JMA process is started by a physician, the insurance company plays a central role, and screening
occurs before cases are filed). See Jean A. Macchiaroli, Medical Malpractice Screening Panels:
Proposed Model Legislation to Cure Judicial Ills, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 181 (1990).
80. Masakatsu Kōmi et al., (Shinpojyūmu) Iryō kago shoshō no shinri ni tsuite [Symposium
Regarding Trials in Medical Malpractice], 1023 HANREI TIMES 6 (2000).
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includes coverage of approximately one million dollars per year with a ten
thousand dollar deductible.81 Physicians with JMA insurance who believe
that they have harmed a patient as a result of malpractice can notify the
local JMA office, which will investigate the incident and, in three to
twelve months, either dismiss the claim or offer compensation. Payments
are generally modest, with a largest recorded payment of $1.3 million.
Since the JMA system is overseen by a mix of JMA officials and
insurance company employees, there is no public reporting requirement
and thus little available data on the frequency or typical disposition of
claims.82 In fact, the system is only minimally publicized, and it is not
clear how well informed patients are about its existence.
The JMA’s extra-judicial dispute resolution mechanism has kept at
least some cases away from the courts, thereby sidestepping the costs of
litigation and providing compensation in certain relatively clear cases in
which judges would be likely to find in favor of plaintiffs.83 One might
have imagined that the government, cognizant of the rising number of
malpractice suits, would have tried to build on the JMA system. Doing so
may have enabled it to keep the courts out of the malpractice business, so
that disgruntled patients would resolve their grievances in a less
adversarial and public way. But that is not how the state responded.
Instead, a patchwork of government initiatives—some targeted generally
at better enabling the business community to resolve disputes through the
courts, and others aimed specifically at medical malpractice litigation—
have made courts far more accessible and attractive to aggrieved patients
than in the past. What this suggests, this Essay has argued, is a
fundamental shift away from efforts to limit recourse to the courts—a shift
that is both the result of and a continuing cause of new structural
configurations and socio-political dispositions. No longer does the state
81. In contrast, the mean medical liability insurance premium in the United States in 2000 was
$18,400, and for OB/GYN it was $39,200. ECON. & STATISTICS ADMIN., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2004–2005, at 109. According to officials at Tokio
Marine, Japan’s largest insurance carrier, the company makes little or no profit on malpractice
insurance. Instead, such insurance is a loss leader, enabling the company to sell physicians other
profitable insurance products, like home and auto insurance. In fact, the cost of insuring a typical
Mercedes in Tokyo is ten times the cost of malpractice insurance. The JMA also supports low
malpractice insurance rates, which it believes help to boost JMA membership.
82. The one published study of the JMA’s liability claims management system indicates that it
handles four hundred claims per year, but this data is old and impossible to verify. See Nakajima et al.,
supra note 8, at 1637; NIHON ISHIKAI [JAPAN MEDICAL ASS’N], NIHON ISHIKAI ISHI BAISHOU SEKININ
HOKEN [THE JAPAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION’S MEDICAL RESPONSIBILITY COMPENSATION
INSURANCE] (2001).
83. The lack of juries in Japan and Japan’s professionalized judiciary make Japanese courts
relatively more predictable than those in the United States. See Ramseyer, supra note 27, at 116–17.
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simply slam the door on tort litigation by making courts particularly
cumbersome and expensive. No longer do potential litigants face such
daunting institutional barriers to suing that they have little choice but to
resolve their claims through alternative channels. Instead, in the face of a
rising tide of malpractice claims, the government has crafted a set of
structural solutions that are at odds with its longstanding posture toward
tort-based conflict. In doing so, it has eliminated many (but not all) of the
impediments to using the courts to manage personal injury claims that
have been the subject of so much attention from legal scholars.84
Changes in the relationship between law and society, however, do not
occur in a vacuum; they are responsive to, and indeed a product of,
economic trends, political opportunities, and social values. This Essay has
thus emphasized not only structural changes in Japanese civil litigation,
but also the socio-political context of the changes surrounding the
emergence and resolution of medical malpractice claims, particularly the
growing negative perception of medical and other elites. Just as legal rules
and procedures have reshaped Japan’s medical malpractice system, so too
has the cultural context of that system been altered. It is difficult, perhaps
impossible, to say whether changes in law triggered or trailed the broader
social changes in which they are embedded. The more important
observation is that the two are closely intertwined, and that a careful
examination of conflicts over medical malpractice reveals their
interdependence.
Broad economic and political factors were crucial to laying the
groundwork of legal reform. The 1990s were a period of economic malaise
in Japan, and Prime Minister Koizumi staked much of his political capital
on administrative, political, and legal reform. Indeed, the changes one
observes in medical malpractice coincide with a more general embrace of
legal reform.85 For almost a decade (and most powerfully since the late
1990s), the banner of “shihō kaikaku” (legal/judicial reform) has been
waved by the Ministry of Justice, Japanese Federation of Bar
84. There is of course nothing irreversible about this shift; old impediments to litigation may in
the future be resuscitated or new ones could be created.
85. Just as one of Tokyo’s local city councils has promoted a new smoke-free sidewalks policy
under the banner that social relations once structured by informal manners are now governed by formal
rules (maná kara, rūru he), the government more generally has expended a tremendous amount of
energy since the late 1990s promoting the idea that the rule of law needs to be strengthened and that
people need to be legally empowered. It is difficult to measure the degree to which such rhetoric
shapes consciousness, not to mention the degree to which this consciousness influences the willingness
to litigate. But there is some empirical support for the claim that rates of litigation are increasing
across the board, and the new rhetoric of legal reform at least suggests a greater willingness to portray
litigation as a social good.
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Associations, Ministry of Education, Secretariat of the Supreme Court,
legal academics, and others, all of whom have come together on a variety
of blue ribbon panels to propose and implement a wide array of changes to
Japan’s legal system. Some have been targeted at specific areas of legal
procedure, like the new Code of Civil Procedure; some have created laws
where none had previously existed, such as the Freedom of Information
Act and the law governing non-profit organizations; still others are aimed
at the legal profession, particularly the restructuring of legal education.
Medical malpractice litigation was hardly the prime mover of these many
reforms, although it was important to some of them, like those involving
the expert witness system. The high visibility of malpractice is the result
of it becoming a “test case,” offering reformers an opportunity to publicly
demonstrate the concrete impact of far-ranging (and often ambiguous) new
legal institutions. For policymakers seeking evidence of their commitment
to civil justice, for example, the acceleration of the resolution of medical
malpractice trials offers a rough-and-ready guide. So the Japanese
government’s new embrace of formal legal mechanisms is particularly
visible in the area of medical malpractice, but it is surely not the only area
of rapid change.
It is tempting to observe the legal changes surrounding medical
malpractice in Japan and conclude that they are yet another example of
Japan’s alleged tendency to become more like the United States.86 In fact,
at least some of the recent changes surrounding tort law and malpractice
litigation in Japan do seem to provide some evidence of “convergence”
with the United States and perhaps a more general “global” convergence.
These include the reliance on the formal legal process as a reasonable
venue for the airing and resolving of malpractice claims, the willingness to
train more attorneys to represent parties in malpractice cases, and the
experimentation with specialized courts and the expert witness system. On
the other hand, significant differences remain between the tort systems of
Japan and the United States (namely the possibility of high pain and
suffering awards, the existence of punitive damages and true contingency
fee billing, the availability of juries, and more), that sharply differentiate
the management of medical malpractice claims in the United States from
those filed in Japan.
86. Medical Malpractice Litigation in Gastroenterological Practice in Japan: A 22-Yr Review of
Civil Court Cases, 101 AM. J. GASTROENTEROLOGY 1951, 1951 (2006) (“[T]he situation [regarding
medical malpractice litigation] in Japan is gradually becoming more like that in the United States.”).
See also R. Daniel Keleman & Eric C. Sibbitt, The Americanization of Japanese Law, 23 U. PA. J.
INT’L ECON. L. 269 (2002).
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The changes described in this Essay, therefore, ought not to be
mistaken for what some have called the “Americanization” of Japanese
law.87 There is no compelling evidence that the Japanese tort system is
converging with the U.S. tort regime, and much to suggest that the area of
medical malpractice in Japan is characterized by structural and social
features that will continue to distinguish it from U.S.-style malpractice
litigation. Instead, what is occurring in Japan is an example of the complex
interplay of formal legal rules and procedures with economic, political,
and social factors that frame their existence, creating a symbiotic
relationship in which structure and culture affect and are affected by each
other. The results are a shift in the importance of tort law and a changed
social context in which it operates. As the legal rules and procedures
governing medical malpractice claims change, so too does the society in
which they are embedded, laying the foundation for yet another stage in
the long relationship between tort law and society.
87. See, e.g., Keleman & Sibbitt, supra note 86. A somewhat stronger case can be made that
malpractice law in Japan has become increasingly similar to that in Canada and the U.K., where pain
and suffering awards are lower than in the United States, punitive damages and juries are uncommon,
and contingency fees are of recent origin.

